





...all that we could do to help them...  
...the time we have...  
...the objective for...  
...the...  
...they are listening to...  
...the time for us to change their minds...  
...the...-taking only what was actually said...  
...have been implicit in some minds--might well have been...  
...on that crucial point, if they had heard it. Our...  
...of determination that we will take action...  
...classifies "if, in the end, it proves inoperative"--...  
...private "decision" were communicated perfectly to...  
...could convey to them very little need for prompt...  
...and if they suspected that we had placed in our...  
...to escape from that onerous task on any...  
...In short, I argue the importance of setting a clear...  
...for us, and one with a much shorter alarm date than that of...  
...POL blockade.

7. A plausible criterion for the time-span that...  
...allied the Soviets/Cubans (and the US!),...  
...the time to now estimate it would take for...  
...military force now on Cuba to reach full operational...  
...reasonable public basis (and a sound private one) to...  
...need to put a short time-limit on their conditions...

...to the removal of the offensive forces to nations of the Western Hemisphere. It is not intended to add to the burden of the offensive forces as to the removal of the offensive forces, fully operational forces, to remove unilaterally in operational force, in the event of nuclear threats against ourselves or third parties.

6. Proposal: That the US primary objective, both in planning and in public statements, should specify a short time limit for the Soviets and/or Cubans to be well embarked upon the process of dismantling and destroying or embarking their nuclear and offensive bombers: e.g., one week. A limit, at least in planning, should also be set for the completion of that task. Moreover, to support that objective, planning schedules for the various tracks should specify dates for decisive U.S. actions to remove the offensive forces (naturally, events may either speed up or delay such action; I still suggest that it is important that at any given time current planning include a specific, and not far off, date at for the alarm to ring on the U.S. clock). That limit should be announced soon: today or tomorrow. During the interval, such preparatory action as massive overflights over the entire island might be taken for reconnaissance, but even more, to be seen (and perhaps to drop leaflets).

7. I have not tried to indicate all the pros and cons of this proposal, in particular the possible disadvantages, or to indicate

